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The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States deals explicitly with the law on international agreements in its
Part III, comprising 39 sections. This Part focuses primarily on the in-
ternational law governing the nature, making, effect, interpretation, inva-:
lidity and termination of international agreements. These sections and
the comments and reporters' notes thereto, however, do not cover all
aspects of the law of the United States relating to international agree-
ments, but leave important pertinent issues to other parts of the Restate-
ment. Thus the complex and controversial problems relating to the
executory or self-executing character of provisions found in international
agreements are dealt with in the text of, and in the comments and report-
ers' notes to, section 111, entitled "International Law and Agreements as
Law of the United States," and sections 703, 713 and 906-907, relating to
the protection of individuals by international law and their remedies for
violation of such protection. This arrangement is due in part to the con-
ception of the Restators I that "[w]hether a treaty is self-executing is a
question distinct from whether the treaty creates private rights or
remedies."2
Part III accepts in large measure the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties3 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between
States and International Organizations or Between International Organi-
zations4 as authoritative guides to the international law of treaties recog-
nized by the United States. In addition, the Restatement deals in section
210 with State Succession to International Agreements, which is the sub-
ject of a further Vienna Convention. 5 Finally, it addresses the nature and
effects of most-favored-nation clauses in section 801, thus taking account
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1. The term "Restators" is chosen to ascribe the views and positions taken in the Restate-
ment to the cumulative wisdom of the members of the American Law Institute, its organiza-
tional hierarchy, and the reporters and advisers.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 comment h (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. May 22, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679.
4. Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543.
5. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 17
I.L.M. 1488.
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of a matter that forms the content of a fourth draft Convention, 6 adopted
by the International Law Commission as part of the U.N. General As-
sembly's Program of the Codification and Progressive Development of
the International Law of Treaties.
Therefore the Restatement's utility or futility in fashioning a service-
able guide to U.S. practice in this vast and important area of interna-
tional law will depend in a large measure on its success in telescoping the
rules and issues forming the body of these Conventions and draft Con-
vention,7 to none of which is the United States a party, into the compara-
tively narrow compass of black letter statements as explained or qualified
by the apparatus of comments and reporters' notes.
Accordingly, this review is divided into two main parts. The first one
will discuss the Restatement's approach to questions of the law on inter-
national agreements as contained in sections 301-339 in addition to sec-
tions 210 and 801, while the second part will focus on sections 111, 703,
713 and 906-907, to the extent that they tackle the distinction between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.
I. Mini-Vienna on the Potomac
The Restatement consolidates the law of treaties between states and
between states and international organizations into one unit, designated
as "Part III International Agreements," leaving the subjects of state suc-
cession to treaties and the law of certain types of treaties (e.g., extradition
treaties), or of certain treaty clauses (e.g., national treatment or Most-
Favored-Nation clauses), to other parts of the Restatement.
Like the Vienna Conventions mentioned above, in general the Restate-
ment does not specifically differentiate between bilateral or multilateral
agreements 8 or between treaties that create obligations and those that-
like treaties of cession-only change the authority over territory. Unlike
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, Part III limits
its treatment of reservations to those involving multilateral international
agreements.9 The Restatement excludes non-legally-binding agreements,
6. Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses, adopted by the International Law
Commission in 1978. For the text, see UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION 156 (4th ed. 1988); see also Report of the International Law Com-
mission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, 8 May-28 July 1978, [1978] 2(2) Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 1, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/33/10.
7. The number of substantive articles of the three Vienna Conventions on aspects of the
law of treaties, plus the draft Convention on Most-Favored-Nations clauses, totals 225.
8. For specific references to particular issues relating to multilateral agreements see, for
example, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 312 comments a and b.




such as the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, '0 from the application of Part III.11 It extends such application
to reciprocal unilateral declarations, such as the acceptances of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ,12 but not to separate unilateral declara-
tions to which customary international law attributes legal effect.'
3
Except in respect to the treatment of reservations to bilateral treaties,
these limitations of Part III appear to be prudent and appropriate.
Part III, Chapter One, bearing the caption "International Agreements:
Definition, Nature, and Scope," does, as it must, reflect the accepted con-
stitutional practice that the President may enter into international agree-
ments either in the form of treaties (i.e., pursuant to Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution with the advice and consent of the Senate), or not in
the form of a treaty. International agreements not in the form of a treaty
may be concluded by the President by virtue of an authorization or ap-
proval by a congressional act, by virtue of an authorization contained in
a treaty, or, finally, on his (or her!) authority within the President's in-
dependent powers under the Constitution.'
4
The Restatement correctly emphasizes the position that, apart from
the prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution applicable to the exer-
cise of authority by the United States, the power of the Federal govern-
ment to make international agreements, especially under Article II of the
10. 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 323 (1975).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 301 comment e, reporters' note 2.
12. Id. § 301 reporters' note 3. Strangely, the Restatement does not mention the mutual
adherences of Iran and the United States to the Declaration of the Government of the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran, 20 I.L.M. 224, or
the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Con-
cerning the Settlement of the Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, United States-Iran, 20 I.L.M.
230, although both Declarations with their adherences are considered international agree-
ments. See, e.g., Islamic Republic of Iran v. Boeing Co., 771 F.2d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 1985);
U.S. Declaration of Adherence: "The two Declarations shall constitute international agree-
ments legally binding upon the United States and Iran," 3 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER, 1980-81 3026 (1982).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 301 reporters' note 3. Despite the Restatement's gingerly
treatment of the matter, there is a long tradition attributing binding effect to unilateral
promises. See Fiedler, Zur Verbindlichkeit einseitiger Vertrdge im Vdlkerrecht, 19 GER. Y.B.
INT'L LAW 35 (1976).
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) §§ 303(2)-303(4). In that respect the Restators rest on firm
ground. See id. § 303 reporters' note 8, referring to the famous Circular 175, 11 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL ch. 700, reprinted in 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 199-215. Although the Restatement refrains from giving an example for
international agreements not in the form of a treaty but pursuant to treaty provisions, a recent
instance may be found in the international agreements implementing articles III and IV of the
Panama Canal Treaty. See Agreement in Implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal
Treaty, United States-Panama, Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10031; Agreement
in Implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty, Sept. 7, 1977, 33 U.S.T.
T.I.A.S. No. 10032.
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Constitution, 15 is not subject to any limitations as to their subject mat-
ter.16 It specifically rejects the limitation to "matters of international
concern." It seems to be clear that the willingness of another nation to
deal with a matter by an agreement with the United States elevates the
subject to a level above purely domestic subjects.
The Restatement seems to confirm the inherent power of the President
to sign non-binding agreements, such as the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 17 Although the Final Act was
not intended to be legally binding, it mandated publication. Accordingly
its text was published in the Department of State Bulletin rather than in
T.IA.S.
Part III, Chapter Two, is entitled "The Making of International
Agreements." In its sections 311-314, the Restatement tracks articles 6-
7, 1-1-16, 18, 19-21, 24 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Thus it accepts the rule that a Presidential expression of intent
to be bound is internationally binding, unless a lack of constitutional au-
thority to do so is manifest and of fundamental importance. 18 It likewise
proceeds on the view that the United States accepts the rule of interna-
tional law that a state is bound to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object of a treaty if it has signed though not expressed its consent to
be bound.19
Undoubtedly the key sections in Chapter Two are the two sections
dealing with "Reservations" (section 313) and "Reservations and Under-
standings: Law of the United States" (section 314). As has been noted
before, the Restatement limits its general treatment to reservations to a
multilateral international agreement. 20 Moreover, even in that context, it
refuses to adopt the definition of a reservation in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, and only refers to a purported distinctive use of
the term by the United States.2 ' In both respects the handling of the
subject by the Restators is open to criticism.
15. According to the Restatement, congressional power to authorize the conclusion of an
international agreement has the same scope of the treaty power under Article V of the Consti-
tution "in every instance," subject to the sole limitation that a majority of the Senate may insist
on submission of the agreement as a treaty. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 303 comment e.
Whether this is true "in every instance" depends on the scope of powers of Congress under
Article I, which is not cited as authority for the position taken.
16. See id. § 302 comment c, reporters' note 2.
17. See supra note 10.
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 311 and comment c.
19. Id. § 312(3); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 3, art. 18(a).
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 313.




The Restators, apparently persuaded by the International Law Com-
mission, 22 state that:
[a]lthough reservations to bilateral agreements have occurred, they do not'
occupy a major place in international law .... If a reservation is attached at
ratification, it constitutes in effect a rejection of the original tentative agree-
ment and a counter-offer of a new agreement. The other party must accept
the agreement as revised by the reservation; if its ratification process has
already been completed it must be reopened to consider the reservation. 23
It is submitted that this statement is much too absolute and not respon-
sive to the practice of the United States in relation to bilateral
agreements. 24
The problems resulting from the addition of reservations, understand-
ings and declarations to the instruments of ratification of bilateral agree-
ments are clearly illustrated by the events occurring during the
ratification process relating to the Panama Canal Treaties, and in partic-
ular the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of
the Panama Canal, 25 whose effectiveness was contested even as late as
1983.26 The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Neu-
trality Treaty by its resolution of March 16, 1978, which included
amendments, conditions, reservations and understandings (designated by
these names and incorporated into the U.S. instrument of ratification).
27
The two items designated as conditions provided:
22. See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth
Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, at 202-03, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966 draft
articles 16 and 17 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties discussed only reservations to
multilateral treaties, given that "[a] reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, be-
cause it amounts to a new proposal reopening the negotiations between the two States concern-
ing the terms of the treaty."). In the final text of the Convention the limitation to multilateral
,treaties was deleted.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 313 comment f. A similar position is taken in the first sen-
tence of section 314 comment c.
24. See id. § 314 comment c (second and third sentences) (Restatement's description of
Executive practice, with regard to multilateral agreements, "of accepting or acquiescing in
reservations made by another state, entered after United States adherence to the treaty, with-
out seeking Senate consent," is based on a constitutional "assumption that the Senate, aware of
Executive practice and acquiescing in it, in giving consent to the treaty also tacitly gives its
consent to later acceptance by the Executive of reservations by other states.") (emphasis
added).
25. Sept. 7, 1977, United States-Panama, 33 U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. 10029 [hereinafter
Neutrality Treaty].
26. The Panama Canal Treaty - Constitutional and Legal Aspects of the Ratification Pro-
cess: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-22 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings].
27. See Proclamation by the President of the United States, reprinted in Neutrality Treaty,
supra note 25, at 3, setting forth the text of the President's Proclamation with the text of the,
Senate resolution subject to the statements designated as amendments, conditions, reserva-
tions, and understandings.
Yale Journal of International Law
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article V or any other provision of
the Treaty, if the Canal is closed, or its operations are interfered with,
the United States of America and the Republic of Panama shall each
independently have the right to take such steps as each deems neces-
sary, in accordance with its constitutional processes, including the use
of military force in the Republic of Panama, to reopen the Canal or
restore the operations of the Canal as the case may be.
(2) The instrument of ratification of the Treaty shall be exchanged only
upon the conclusion of a Protocol of Exchange, to be signed by author-
ized representatives of both Governments, which shall constitute an in-
tegral part of the Treaty documents, and which shall include the
following:
Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude the Republic of Panama and the
United States of America from making ... any agreement or arrange-
ment between the two countries to facilitate performance at any time
after December 31, 1999, of their responsibilities to maintain the regime
of neutrality established in the treaty, including agreements or arrange-
ments for the stationing of any United States military forces or the
maintenance of defense sites after that date in the Republic of Panama
28
The Republic of Panama, in its instrument of ratification, included a
recital of the amendments, conditions, reservations and understandings
set forth in the U.S. instrument of ratification, and added the following
understandings and declaration:
The Republic of Panama agrees to the exchange of the instruments of
ratification of the... Neutrality Treaty on the understanding that there are
positive rules of public international law contained in multilateral treaties
to which both the Republic of Panama and the United States of America
are Parties and which consequently both States are bound to implement in
good faith, such as Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article 2, paragraph 4 of the
Charter of the United Nations, and Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States.
It is also the understanding of the Republic of Panama that the actions
which either Party may take in the exercise of its rights and the fulfillment
of its duties in accordance with the ... Neutrality Treaty, including meas-
ures to reopen the Canal or to restore its normal operation, if it should be
interrupted or obstructed, will be effected in a manner consistent with the
principles of mutual respect and cooperation on which the new relationship
established by those treaties is based.
The Republic of Panama declares that its political independence, territo-
rial integrity, and self-determination are guaranteed by the unshakeable will
of the Panamanian people. Therefore, the Republic of Panama will reject,
28. Resolution of Ratification, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 7187 (1978). See




in unity and with decisiveness and firmness, any attempt by any country to
intervene in its internal or external affairs. 29
The understandings (but not the declaration) included in the Panama-
nian instrument of ratification were repeated verbatim in the Protocol of
Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Neutrality Treaty and the
Panama Canal Treaty, by which the Parties agreed "that . . . the ex-
change of instruments of ratification shall be effective on April 1,
1979."30
In view of the fact that the Panamanian statements, attached to its
instrument of ratification, were couched in the form of "understandings"
and a "declaration," they were not submitted to the Senate for advice
and consent before their acceptance in the Protocol of Exchange of In-
struments of Ratification. Although the constitutionality of the action of
the Executive was ably defended by the representative of the State De-
partment with the comment that only the addition of true reservations by
the other party would require renewed submission to the Senate, 31 the
Restatement's comment a to section 313 and comment c to section 314
seem to cast unnecessary doubts on the validity of the treaties and should
at least have alluded and alerted to the issue. Actually the understand-
ings and declaration in the Panamanian instrument of ratification did not
relate to the text of the treaty but to the text of condition (1) of the U.S.
instrument of ratification.32 Moreover, since the Senate had notice of it
both before and after the exchange of the instruments without revoking
its advice and consent, 33 the United States seems to have acquiesced to
the Panamanian statements.
Similarly, issue might be taken with the Restatement's idiosyncratic
assertion that a statement of understanding included in the Senate's reso-
29. The declaration of Panama, set forth in the third paragraph of the added text quoted
above, is part of the final Panamanian instrument of ratification, although it was not inserted in
the Protocol of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification regarding the two Panama Canal
Treaties. See 1978 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1055-56.
The proposed instrument of ratification of Panama had been transmitted to the U.S. govern-
ment for comments and found unobjectionable. See Hearings, supra note 26, at 259, 323-36,
343. The omission of the declaration from the Protocol of Exchange of Instruments of Ratifi-
cation which included the two Panamanian understandings was apparently suggested by the
United States.
30. For the text of the Protocol of Exchange of Instruments of Ratification, see Neutrality
Treaty, supra note 25, at 32.
31. See Hearings, supra note 26, at 102 (testimony of Assistant Legal Advisor Robert E.
Dalton).
32. See supra text accompanying note 28.
33. See Hearings, supra note 26, at 120 (statement of Mr. Dalton that "(i)n the course of
close consultations prior to the exchange of instruments of ratification, the Executive made
Panama's proposed instruments available to the Senate leadership and to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee").
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lution of advice and consent is binding on domestic courts.34 It would
seem that a treaty should have the same effect domestically as it has in-
ternationally, and that the domestic courts should value an understand-
ing in the way it would be valued by an international tribunal. 35
Chapter Four of Part III is entitled "Invalidity and Termination of
International Agreements." The Restatement correctly follows the rules
adopted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that error or
fundamental change of circumstances are valid grounds for termination
only if the assumption of the existence of a fact or situation, or the con-
tinued existence of circumstances, constitutes "an essential basis of the
consent of the parties to be bound."' 36 Although the Restators appropri-
ately stressed the differences between the international law of interna-
tional agreements and domestic contract law, recognition of the
"doctrine of frustration" or Wegfall der Geschdftsgrundlage may well be
dictated by the general principles functioning as sources of customary
international law.37
II. Self-executability v. Invocability: Stance or Substance
The Restators, while attempting to expound the doctrine of self-exe-
cuting treaties, insist on a distinction between "self-executability" and
"invocability" by individuals in domestic courts. 38 Although in the most
recent discussion of that distinction by Professor John Jackson, 39 that
author approves the Restators' "small but undeveloped reference to this
distinction" 4 and sides with "[o]ther eminent scholars [who] have men-
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 314 comment d.
35. Of course, if an understanding added to the instrument of ratification of a bilateral
treaty by one party is expressely or impliedly accepted by the other party, as, for example, by a
protocol of exchange of ratifications, the understanding becomes an agreed upon interpretation
of the treaty. For a strong criticism of the Restatement's erratic and misguided attribution of
binding effect on purely unilateral expressions of understanding, see the recent discussion of
these issues in United States v. Stuart, 109 S.Ct. 1183, 1195-97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring),
Justice Brennan's comment that "Senate debates do not occur behind closed doors," id. at
1192 n.7, does not supply the other party's assent to the proposed "understanding."
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 336(a); see also id. § 331(l)(a).
37. For the interrelation between the doctrines of rebus sic stantibus and frustration, see
the reports of the two last special reporters on the Law of Treaties, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and
Sir Humphrey Waldock. Law of Treaties: Second Report by G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rap.
porteur, [1957] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 16, at 60, para. 151, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/107; Second
Report on the Law of Treaties by H. Waldock, [1963] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, at 84, para.
12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/156 and Add.l-3.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § I I 1 comments g and h; id. reporters' notes 4-6; see also
id. §§ 703, 713, 906-907 (dealing "with rights that an individual may invoke").
39. Jackson, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, United States of America, in 7 THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAW 141 (F. Jacobs & S. Roberts eds. 1987).
40. Id. at 146.
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tioned this distinction" 41-referring to my own writings in that list42-I
feel that some additional clarification is needed. As Professor Jackson
states: "Some of the discussion of this distinction ... seems to confuse
some attributes of the concept. '43 Nevertheless, even his own efforts
seem to intertwine "standing" and "attribution of rights," which are not
necessarily merely two different labels for the same idea.
Unfortunately legal terms do not convey the same meaning to different
judges or different scholars. This is particularly true of the term "self-
executing." On the one hand the phrase may mean no more than that
the agreement is self-contained, that it creates no obligations but that it
itself effects a change of legal relations. International agreements as well
as domestic contracts of that type are often called "dispositive" 44 agree-
ments, and include treaties of cession or boundary regulation in interna-
tional law or conveyances and assignments in domestic law. Domestic
writings abound with that distinction which goes back to the writers at
the beginning of the nineteenth century, if not to much earlier days.
Modern French scholars speak of conventions de disposition, including
contrats translatifs.45 The California Civil Code provides that "[a] volun-
tary transfer [of property] is an executed contract, subject to all rules of
law concerning contracts in general, except that a consideration is not
necessary to its validity."'46
Nevertheless, as a matter of precedent and practice the term self-exe-
cuting should not be reserved to dispositive treaties but rather to interna-
tional agreements that are meant, and are specific enough to be able, to
establish rights and duties of individuals directly enforceable in domestic
courts. While the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court on self-ex-
ecutability arose in conjunction with a cession of territory, 47 it was the
provisions relating to the rights of private grantees in the treaty that
prompted the distinction.
I hasten to add that the utility of a distinction and the meaning of a
term depend on the characteristics ascribed to it. Unfortunately not all
41. Id.
42. Id. at 156 n.66.
43. Id. at 146.
44. See, e.g., the Government of the Netherlands' reference to dispositive treaties quoted in
the comments to article 44 of the ILC's draft of the Law of Treaties. Fifth Report on the Law
of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock Special Rapporteur, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1,
at 39-40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/183 and Add.1-4.
45. G. MARTY & P. RAYNAUD, 1 DRorr CIVIL: INTRODUCTION Gf-NtRALE 219, 281 (2d
ed. 1972); J. CARBONNIER, 4 DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 42 (12th ed. 1985).
46. Cal. Civ. Code § 1040 (West 1982) (enacted 1872).
47. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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scholars agree on the precise significance of the term "self-executing";
some of them include effects not necessarily germane to the criteria con-
sidered by others as decisive. This applies in particular to recent studies
by Professors Paust 48 and Iwasawa.49 Professor Paust's introductory
sentence falls precisely in the second category, by calling the distinction
"a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with express
language in the Constitution that 'all treaties ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.' -50 Of course, they are. But being the supreme law of
the land does not make them necessarily cognizable in domestic courts as
sources of individual rights.
Chief Justice Marshall understood the question of whether a treaty
provision was "executory" or "executed" 51 to mean whether the treaty
provision as such could be acted upon by the courts. In his famous hold-
ing on the effect of Article VIII of the treaty between the United States
and Spain of 22nd February 1819,52 he said:
Although the words "shall be ratified and confirmed," are properly the
words of contract, stipulating for some future legislative act; they are not
necessarily so. They may import that they "shall be ratified and confirmed"
by force of the instrument itself. When we observe that in the counterpart
of the same treaty, exectited at the same time by the same parties, they are
used in this sense, we think the construction proper, if not unavoidable.
3
Chief Justice Marshall recognized expressly that this ruling reversed
his prior construction of the same article in Foster v. Neilson ,4 but no-
where was it remotely suggested that the article, even if construed as
executory, was not considered to be the supreme law of the land. The
latter phrase just is not identical or even overlapping with the idea of
being self-executing.
The idea of a self-executing treaty provision in the sense of its direct
applicability in a domestic court was by no means an invention of the
nineteenth century. The Treaty of Peace between Spain and the Nether-
lands of January 30, 164855 bristles with self-executing provisions. More-
over, article XXIX stipulates expressly that "if in any place a difficulty is
48. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988).
49. See Iwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical
Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986).
50. Paust, supra note 48, at 760 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2).
51. The issue was posed in that form by Mr. White, counsel for Percheman: "Whether is
the 8th article executory or executed." Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 63.
52. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Feb. 22, 1819, United States-Spain, 8 Stat.
252.
53. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 89 (emphasis added).
54. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
55. 1 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES I (C. Parry ed. 1969).
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encountered in the restitution of property and rights subject to restitution
the local judge shall without delay take care that the restitution is ef-
fected and pursue the shortest way for that purpose."
'56
Although Chief Justice Marshall played a leading part in the formula-
tion of the doctrine, it was alluded to in his presence long before that.5 7
The reporters' notes erroneously assert that "(i)n fact, few other states
distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties."5 8
Years ago I pointed out that actually a great number of nations-outside
the sphere of the former British Commonwealth countries-make that
distinction.59 Recently Professor Iwasawa has supported my statement,
confirming that the doctrine of self-executing treaties "is no longer
merely an American doctrine, but one which is recognized by interna-
tional lawyers and scholars throughout the world."' 60 Without attempt-
ing a country-by-country analysis, attention should be called to the fact
that the question of whether international agreements concluded by the
European Economic Community with other nations are or are not self-
executing has required resolution by the Court of Justice of the European
Community on several occasions. 61 Generally speaking the Court has
applied a test similar to that governing the U.S. courts, viz. the intent of
the parties to the agreement and sufficient specificity to permit direct ap-
plication in the domestic courts of the Member States.62 The doctrine of
self-executability is poised at the interface of international and constitu-
56. Id. at 20 (author's translation). In the original Latin:
Si in aliquo loco difficultas moveatur super restitutione bonorum & jurium
restituendorum, Iudex loci sine dilatione curet ut restitutio sortiatur effectum, & brevis-
simam ad id sequatur viam.
Id.
57. Reporters' note 5 to section 111 of the Restatement justly refers to Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall) 199 (1796), as a seminal case. But the Restators failed to note that it was plain-
tiffs' counsel, Mr. Tilgham, and following him, Justice Iredell, who first enunciated the distinc-
tion between executory and executed articles in treaties. Justice Iredell, being in the minority,
concluded that article 4 of the Jay Treaty was executory rather than executed and promised
legislative implementation. Id. at 271-72. It is not without significance that the later Chief
Justice was one of the counsels for defendants.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters' note 5.
59. See Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win At
Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896 (1980).
60. Iwasawa, supra note 49, at 628.
61. See, e.g., International Fruit Company N.V. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit,
1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219; Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie., KG.a.A.,
1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3641; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societa Pe-
trolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI), 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
801; SocietA Italiana per 'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v. Ministero delle Finanze, 1983 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 731; Compagnia Singer SpA and Geigy SpA v. Amministrazione delle
Finanze dello Stato, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 847; Demirel v. Stadt Schwaibisch Gmiind,
[1989] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 421.
62. According to the ECJ, an agreement is self-executing if, according to its spirit, struc-
ture and terms, it seeks to create rights to be relied upon by private parties in domestic courts,
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tional law: The parties to the agreement must seek to establish suffi-
ciently definite rights, immunities or privileges of private parties
assertable in domestic courts. The U.S. Constitution gives effect to such
agreements without need for corresponding legislation.
Upon conclusion, an agreement of that type may be invoked by the
persons sought to be protected. The courts are charged with the final
determination of whether an agreement is self-executing. The President
and Congress may have to decide initially whether to call for or enact
implementing legislation. But the ultimate interpretation of the interna-
tional agreement rests with the courts. While in a litigation involving the
issue of self-executability the views of the Executive are entitled to great
weight, there are instances where the Department of State's views were
rejected both by the courts and Congress.63 As has been mentioned
before, despite the views expressed in the Restatement, it is questionable
whether the Senate can bind the courts by appending an understanding
to its resolution of advice and consent. Certainly views expressed by U.S.
negotiators during the ratification process require careful scrutiny of the
context in which they were made, especially with respect to multilateral
agreements. 64
In sum, the question of whether individuals should be entitled to pro-
tection and relief in domestic courts with respect to the guarantees stipu-
lated in the treaty is primarily an issue of international import to be
and its provisions are sufficiently precise to permit application by the courts. See, e.g.,
Demirel, [1989] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 430-31; see generally supra note 61.
63. A classic example is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. In the case of United States v. Enger, 472
F. Supp. 490, 542 (D.N.J. 1978), the court rejected the position of the United States that the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is not self-executing. The interpretation of the
court is confirmed by the Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a-254e (1978 & West
Supp. 1989), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1364 (West Supp. 1988), which extends the domestic effects of the
Convention to the missions, families, and diplomatic couriers of a sending state which has not
ratified the Vienna Convention.
64. In Unites States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had to pass on the self-executing character of article 6 of the
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S.
82. Judge Tjoflat denied the self-executing nature of that provision because of the testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Mr. Arthur Dean, the Chairman of the U.S.
Delegation to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference. 589 F.2d at 881. Actually, Mr. Dean,
responding to a question of Senator Long, merely said: "there is not-anything in any of these
conventions that we are presenting to the Senate which, so far as I am specifically aware,...
would supersede domestic legislation." Id. (quoting Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Hear-
ings on Executives J, K, L, M, N Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong. 2d
Sess. 75 (1960)). It seems amazing that this statement was held to "clearly indicate that it was
not the intent of our delegation to affect the domestic legislation of the United States ....." Id.
Obviously the purpose of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas was to limit the jurisdic-
tion of the parties to the convention over vessels on the high seas flying the flag of another state
party, regardless of any prior inconsistent legislation.
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determined by the intent of the parties as manifested in the treaty.
Whether the treaty is capable of having that effect without further legis-
lative action is left by international law to the domestic law of each party.
Self-executing character and invocability are synonymous. To treat them
as separate notions is confused and confusing. The rule that a statute
should be construed in conformity with a treaty does not render the
treaty to be the basis of the relief.
Conclusion
As must be clear from the foregoing discussion, the reviewer has mis-
givings with respect to a number of comments and reporters' notes. That
does not mean that he does not respect the vast amount of learning dis-
played in those comments and reporters' notes. It does signify, however,
that the law of foreign relations seems to be too complex to be subject to
a Restatement and the ordinary processes of the American Law Institute
and too serious to be left to the generalists.
